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I.  EXPOSITION 
As we enter the new century, the world around us is becoming increasingly 
commercialized.  Wal-Mart stores are in every suburb and Gap billboards loom over 
many major metropolitan streets.  It is nearly impossible to go anywhere and not see 
trademarks. Motion picture film producers often use our everyday world as a 
backdrop and would be extremely limited if every time a trademark appeared within 
the frame, they were liable for trademark infringement.  This may be the case 
however, under the current laws, no matter how extreme the result may be.   
Trademark holders are entitled to certain protections from unauthorized uses of 
their trademark.  This protection rests in two distinct causes of action.  First, the 
Lanham Act protects trademark holders from use of their mark that would create 
consumer confusion over the source of the product or service.1  Secondly, the state 
anti-dilution statutes, and more recently, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
protects holders from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of their mark.2  
                                                                
115 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).  
2President Signs Hatch Trademark Bill Into Law, Gov’t Press Release, Jan. 18, 1996, 1996 
WL 5167042. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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Both federal and state causes of action hinge upon the court finding the secondary 
use of the trademark occurred in a commercial context.3 
Trademark infringement results when a secondary user’s use of the trademark or 
a substantially similar mark would likely cause confusion as to the source of the 
product.4  When someone uses a trademark of another or a similar mark and such use 
would lead to “false designations of origin,” it violates Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act.5  It follows that if a product appears in a film, a viewer might assume the film 
has been somehow sponsored or approved by the maker of the product.6  If a 
                                                                
315 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 
1997 & Supp. 2000). 
415 U.S.C.A. § 1114 provides: “(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the 
registrant–(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a 
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of 
any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a 
registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to 
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in 
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of 
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies 
hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover 
profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is 
intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 
5ANNE HAIRING, UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW: BASIC PRINCIPLES OF 
TRADEMARK LAW 47 (Lynn S. Fruchter, Anne Hairing, & Robert M. Newbury, Co-Chairs, 
Practising Law Institute Co. 1999); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 is limited to “false designations of 
origin,” and expressly not limited to, and even expressly created for, situations in which the 
mark is not registered. This is an unfair competition section. It is generally recognized that this 
section is a federal bar against false advertising within limits.; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 provides:  
“(a)(1) any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for 
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which – (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 
6The practice of product placement, though common in the film industry today is beyond 
the scope of this note. Product placement is a commercial arrangement between the movie 
studios and the company whereby commercial products are conspicuously “placed” in the 
film.  See Robert Adler, Here’s Smoking At You, Kid: Has Tobacco Product Placement in the 
Movies Really Stopped? 60 MONT. L. REV. 243 (1999).  The prevalence of product placement 
agreements between film studios and makers of consumer products, however, may complicate 
the issue.  The more the movie-going public becomes accustomed to paid advertisements 
being present in films, the more likely they may be to associate the maker of the consumer 
product with sponsorship of the film.  The actual practice of product placement dates back to 
the early 1980’s and can be seen in films as memorable and diverse as Murphy’s Romance, 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/9
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trademark were to appear in the background of a film, or a character in a film were to 
refer to a product by its trademarked name, this may not meet the standard for 
traditional infringement under the Lanham Act, but may meet the less stringent 
requirements of Section 43(a) for a finding of trademark dilution.  
In copyright law, there exists a doctrine of fair use, now codified into the statute, 
which allows subsequent users substantial freedom to use materials copyrighted by 
another person in certain contexts.7  Courts have used similar “fair-use” analysis in 
trademark cases, although it has not been codified.8  
With the addition of the FTDA to the Lanham Act in 1996, a broader standard 
has been proffered which may pose a great danger to filmmakers.  The FTDA 
eliminated the Lanham Act’s requirement of likelihood of confusion, thus 
broadening the scope of activity that would violate the Act.  The broader standard 
may potentially conflict with a secondary users’ rights of free expression.  
An adaptation of a similar fair use standard as that codified in copyright laws 
should be applied by courts to the Lanham Act.9  This would alleviate the current 
disparities between courts in allowing a uniform standard for courts to apply to very 
similar facts.  The FTDA should also be re-examined for the dangers it poses on 
freedom of speech.10  The current standards in the amended Lanham Act are 
unevenly applied and too broad, encompassing a wide range of activities that may 
violate the act.  Filmmakers at any level should not be limited in their ability to 
capture the essence of the world around them by strictly construed trademark laws.  
Trademarks have become the backdrops of our increasingly commercialized society, 
and photographers and filmmakers cannot be held liable for infringement for 
depicting such marks. 
                                                          
and E.T. Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning 
Films Into Commercial Speech? 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301-02, 306 (1992). 
717 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000). 
8The Lanham Act does provide a defense to infringement where the defendant uses the 
mark “otherwise than as a mark” and “fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or 
services of [the defendant.]” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4) (West 2000); see infra note 88.  
9Fair use has been applied by the courts to trademark cases, but courts have reached 
divergent results.  See section II. B. i. for discussion of these cases.  
10See David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531 
(1991).  The author posits that the government’s interests in protecting trademarks cannot 
outweigh an author or artists’ freedom of speech and true cases of “genericide” can be dealt 
with through tor law and not trademark law.  See also Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: 
Towards a Reconciliation with the Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
105 (1997). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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II.  TRADEMARK LAW AND THE MOVIES : 
A.  The Script 
1.  The Lanham Act 
The only federal protection that exists for trademark holders is the Lanham Act.11  
A federal claim under the Lanham Act protects consumers from confusion with 
regard to the source of the goods.12  Congress enacted the Act in 1946, with the dual 
purpose of codifying existing common law and solidifying goodwill with the 
business community and public.13  The Act protects consumers from potential 
confusion when a secondary user uses a trademark in commerce by enforcing a 
trademark holder’s right to use the mark exclusively.14  Traditional trademark law 
has limited infringing uses to those used in connection with the sale of goods and 
services, in the case of a registered service mark.15 
The Lanham Act protects the use of “any word, name, symbol, or device or any 
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his 
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.”16  Under the 
veil of the Act, merchants’ and manufacturers’ investments of time, energy, and 
money in advertisement and development of their products is protected from 
                                                                
11Supra note 1. 
12See Peter W. Smith, Trademarks, Parody, and Consumer Confusion: A Workable 
Lanham Act Infringement Standard, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1525 (1991); 15. U.S.C. § 1114 (1) 
provides for civil liability against any person who shall, without consent of the registrant use 
any mark or colorable imitation of a registered mark in commerce or in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with 
such use as is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 
13Smith, supra note 12, at 1530. 
14Steven M. Perez, Comment, Confronting Biased Treatment of Trademark Parody Under 
The Lanham Act, 44 EMORY L.J. 1451, 1457 (1995); See American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 
947 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Mich. 1996). In American Express, the court reached a finding 
that summary judgement was inappropriate where American Express Co. sought a preliminary 
injunction that would prohibit CFK, Inc. from using its trademark slogans, “DON’T LEAVE 
HOME WITHOUT IT,” “DON’T LEAVE HOME WITHOUT US,” and “DON’T LEAVE 
HOME WITHOUT THEM,” and concluded that the phrase “DON’T LEAVE HOME 
WITHOUT . . .” was a famous trademark; see also I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 11 F. 
Supp. 2d 127, 129 (D. Mass. 1998), vacated in part, 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998).  In I.P. Lund, 
the court reversed a grant of preliminary injunction based on infringement of the configuration 
of a water faucet having a downward curving water pipe protruding from a wall (rather than 
the sink itself) and a similarly protruding control rod to regulate both water flow and 
temperature instead of the usual pair of spigots.  Id. 
15Id. 
1615 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 2000); Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 118 F. 3d 56 (1st Cir. 1997).  
Trademark which once protected only words or symbols has been extended over the years by 
courts to also protect design, packaging, and other features of the product itself.  In Chrysler, 
the court found that trademark protection did extend to the design of the Dodge Viper. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/9
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subsequent users.17  Suits for infringement focus on subsequent users’ attempts at  
“passing off” their goods as that of another, thus confusing the public as to the 
correct source of the good.18  In order for a trademark holder to seek protection under 
the Lanham Act, he must be able to show bona fide use in commerce.19 Bona fide 
use in commerce means a bona fide sale or transportation in commerce “which may 
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”20 
Once a trademark holder has proved that he is entitled to the protections of the 
Lanham Act,21 the allegedly infringing mark in analyzed in its context to determine if 
a “likelihood of confusion” exists.22  A likelihood of confusion standard is satisfied 
when there is (a) confusion of an appreciable number of buyers, and (b) confusion is 
“probable.”23  A finding that confusion is merely possible is not sufficient.24 
The test courts use to determine likelihood of confusion was set out by Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.25  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
                                                                
17J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 2:39 
(4th ed. 1999). 
18I.P. Lund., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
1915 U.S.C.A. § 1051(a) (West 2000).  Bona fide use has to occur in the ordinary course of 
trade and cannot be for the sole purpose of maintaining trademark rights.; See Blue Bell v. 
Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1974).  In Blue Bell, the court found that a single use 
of a trademark followed by a continued use is sufficient where both were used as labels on 
clothing distributed to clothing stores.; see also Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, 
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1976). The Koffler court held that mere advertising is not 
sufficient to support bona fide use of a trademark. 
2015 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2000).  This requirement breaks down into two elements: (1) 
Was the transaction upon which the registration application was founded bona fide; and (2) 
was it followed by activities proving a continuous effort or intent to use the mark. MCCARTHY, 
supra note 17, at § 19:37[C]; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3, Congress is authorized to protect 
trademarks through its commerce power derived from the Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  
21This is usually presumed if there is registration on the principal register, and thus not an 
issue.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2000). 
2215 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1) (West 2000).   
23Id. 
24MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 23:3; August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616 
(7th Cir. 1995).  The August Storck court reversed a granting of a preliminary injunction and 
stated that a “possibility” of confusion cannot be the test because: “Many consumers are 
ignorant or inattentive, so some are bound to misunderstand no matter how careful a producer 
is.”; See also Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2d Cir. 1997).  The Lauder 
court held that a likelihood of confusion means a probability of confusion; “it is not sufficient 
if confusion is merely possible.”  Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th 
Cir. 1998).  The Presley court held that a “[l]ikelihood of confusion is synonymous with a 
probability of confusion, which is more than a mere possibility of confusion.”  Id. 
25287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).  “At the outset, it must be remembered just what the 
Polaroid factors are designed to test.  The factors are designed to help grapple with the 
‘vexing’ problem of resolving the likelihood of confusion issue. . . .  It also must be 
emphasized that the ultimate conclusion as to whether a likelihood of confusion exists is not to 
be determined in accordance with some rigid formula.  The Polaroid factors service as a useful 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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set out eight factors which help courts determine likelihood of confusion. These are: 
(1) the strength of the mark, (2) degree of similarity between the two marks, (3) 
proximity of the two products, (4) likelihood of the senior user bridging the gap in 
proximity, (5) actual confusion, (6) defendant’s good faith, (7) quality of defendant’s 
product, and (8) sophistication of buyers.26  These factors are not exhaustive and the 
courts use them as a balancing test when appropriate.27 
A primary difference between the Lanham Act and state anti-dilution laws is that 
the dilution laws allow recovery for infringement of a trademark when used on 
unrelated goods.28  Dilution may apply to any use, not just trademark use or use on 
competing goods.29  Historically, dilution statutes were enacted to protect a 
trademark’s inherent selling power and goodwill with respect to a specific good.30  
Also, unlike claims under the Lanham Act, state dilution claims do not necessitate a 
finding of likelihood of confusion and use must be “commercial” in nature.31  
2.  State Anti Dilution Statutes and the FTDA 
The original Lanham Act did not cover uses of similar or the same strong marks 
by non-competitors.32  State anti-dilution statues covered this area until recently.  
Usually different products were involved in such actions, and thus a likelihood of 
confusion was not involved.  States recognized a trademark holder’s rights to be free 
                                                          
guide through a difficult quagmire.”  799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d cir. 1986).  Each factual case 
presents its own peculiar circumstances; see also Orient Express Trading Co. v. Federated 
Dep‘t Stores Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1308, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988).  The Orient court stated, “[W]e do 
not mean to suggest that district courts must slavishly recite the litany of all eight Polaroid 
factors in each and every case”; Physicians Formula Cosmetics Inc. v. West Cabot Cosmetics, 
Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1136, 1140 (2d Cir. 1988).  In Physicians the court stated “[The Polaroid 
test] is a non- exhaustive catalogue of factors to be considered. . . .”  Id. 
26Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495. 
27Id.; Laura L. Gribbin, Casenote, The Controversy Over Miss Piggy’s New Friend: Issues 
of Infringement and Dilution in Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, 4 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 353, 358-59 (1997). 
28MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 24:72. 
29Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 
1989).  The Mead Court established factors as follows: similarity of the marks, similarity of 
the products covered by the marks, sophistication of consumers, predatory intent, renown of 
the senior mark and renown of the junior mark.  Applying those factors, the court held that 
plaintiff had proven dilution of its mark by defendant.  The Second Circuit stated that for 
blurring to occur “there must be some mental association between plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
marks,” citing Professor McCarthy’s observation that “if a reasonable buyer is not at all likely 
to link the two uses of the trademark in his or her own mind, even subtly or subliminally, then 
there can be no dilution. . . .”  Id. at 1031 (quoting MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 24:13 at 213-14 (4th ed. 1997)).   
30Gribbin, supra note 27, at 355. 
31American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Productions, Inc., 35. F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 
(D. Minn. 1998); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127.  
32I.P. Lund, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/9
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from dilution of its mark by being associated with another maker’s product, even in 
the case where the product is unique from its own.33   
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), which was signed into law by 
President Clinton in 1995, and formally adopted in 1996, defines dilution as, “the 
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods.”34  
Congress determined that the system of different state anti-dilution statutes was 
inadequate and provided inconsistent protection for trademarks in the global 
marketplace.35  The common law rules of state anti-dilution statutes became part of 
the Lanham Act and provided injunctive relief for findings of dilution.36   
Under the FTDA, a trademark holder can prove dilution by a secondary user if he 
can prove the following: (1) his mark is famous37 and (2) subsequent use occurred 
after his mark became famous.  He also must prove that the (3) subsequent use was 
commercial,38 and (4) this use has caused dilution of the trademark.39  A trademark 
holder who is able to prove dilution under these requirements put forth by the FTDA 
in the amended Lanham Act is entitled to damages and possibly destruction of the 
infringing goods under the statute as amended.40  
The FTDA may pose a more serious threat for filmmakers than found under the 
original Lanham Act.41  A finding of dilution does not require a finding that 
consumers would likely be confused by the allegedly infringing use.  A mere 
appearance of a mark in a film would not likely violate a trademark holders rights 
because it may be difficult, even if the mark is prevalent in the film, to find a 
likelihood that consumers would be mislead as to the source of the film.  According 
to the standards of dilution, however, a much less stringent standard, non-competing 
uses of a mark which would “blur” its strength would violate a holder’s rights.  It is 
necessary to examine how courts have analyzed the FTDA in order to weight the 
                                                                
33Id. 
3415 U.S.C.A. § 1127; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c), added by PUB. L. NO. 104-98, § 3(a) (1996).  
35I.P. Lund, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 133; The FTDA would “recognize the substantial 
investment the owner has made in the mark and commercial value of the aura of the mark 
itself” by granting protection to both competitors and non-competitors.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-
374 (1995). 
36Hairing, supra note 5, at 49; Exxon Corp. v. Oxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1076 
(5th Cir. 1997).  The Exxon court stated, “[A] federal cause of action for trademark dilution 
was… not available until the Lanham Act was amended to include one in 1996.” 
3715 U.S.C.A. § 1125, The FTDA lists eight factors a court may consider in determining 
whether a mark is distinctive and famous.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (West 2000); § 1118 (West 
2000). 
3815 U.S.C.A. § 1127, defines “use in commerce” as the bona fide use of a mark in the 
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. 
3915 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c). 
40Id.; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a), § 1118.  
41George Vetter and Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and the Artist – Part I, 
44 R.I.B.J. 9 (Apr. 1996).  “An expressive use of a trademark, such as Andy Warhol’s 
Campbell’s Soup Cans or Jasper John’s Ballentine Ale Cans, could be argued as diluting those 
trademarks.” 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
422 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:415 
level of danger it poses for filmmakers.  Critics of the FTDA have voiced concerns 
about its possible conflict with the First Amendment.42 
The FTDA requires that a plaintiff seeking protection must have a strong mark in 
the first place.43  The strength of the mark is not a factor under the Lanham Act.  
When passing the FTDA, there was opposition to this requirement as it was seen to 
favor large industries with big marketing budgets.44  The Act outlined several factors 
courts should using in weighing whether a mark is famous, but the factors are not 
dispositive.45  
Proof of wrongful intent is neither a requirement for a finding of dilution in the 
state antidilution statutes nor the FTDA.  However, an award of damages is allowed 
pursuant to the federal statute if the plaintiff can prove that the diluting user willfully 
intended to impede the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of the mark.  Subject 
to the principles of equity, if willful intent is proved, a plaintiff is entitled to all of the 
remedies available to those litigants who have proved federal trademark 
infringement or federal unfair competition under the Lanham Act. This can include 
the defendant’s profits, any damages sustained by the plaintiff, costs, up to three 
times the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, and, in some exceptional cases, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees.  Other available remedies include an order for the 
destruction of articles bearing the diluting mark.46 
The FTDA is limited to use which is “commercial.”  Use that is commercial 
should not be confused with use that constitutes commercial activity.  In a case 
decided by the New York Supreme Court, Joe Namath sued Sports Illustrated for 
printing his picture without his permission. The court held that even though the 
magazine was a commercial enterprise and would presumably profit from the use of 
                                                                
42See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028, at 6-7 (1992).  Trademark dilution raises significant First 
Amendment concerns when applied to comparative advertising or non-commercial parodies. 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, PUB. L. NO. 104-98, § 3(a)(4), 109 STAT. 985, 986 
(1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)). 
43Marks registered on the Principal Register upon application of the mark’s user, to which 
the Lanham Act rights attaches must meet the statutory requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1052 
(2000). 
44See Vincent Palladino, Revive Federal Dilution Law, MANHATTAN LAW, Nov. 7/13, 
1989, at 13. 
4515 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) provides, “In determining whether a mark is distinctive and 
famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to – (A) the degree of inherent or 
acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) The duration and extant of use of the mark in 
connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent 
of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in 
which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods and services with which the 
mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of 
trade used by the mark’s owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the 
nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the 
mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on 
the principal register.” 
4638 AM. JUR. P.O.F. 3D, Dilution of a Trademark § 16 (1996). 
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his picture, this was not commercial use.47  Copyright law recognizes this doctrine 
that simply because the alleged infringer is a profitable enterprise, does not 
automatically deem the use ‘commercial’.48  With the addition of the FTDA, similar 
analysis has been proffered by courts in deciding trademark dilution disputes.49 
A finding of dilution can be divided into two major subsets: The goodwill of a 
famous mark can be eroded when consumers can see the unique mark on many 
different goods. This type of dilution is called ‘dilution by blurring.’50  On the other 
hand, ‘dilution by tarnishment’ occurs when a famous mark is used on goods of 
inferior quality or in an “unwholesome” context.51  
a.  Dilution by Blurring 
The doctrine of ‘dilution by blurring’ is applied where a mark is used on different 
goods coming from different sources.52  Although a finding of likelihood of 
confusion is not required to meet a blurring standard, the doctrine seeks to protect 
consumers from that confusion.53  If a mark were allowed to be placed on goods as 
varied as cars and restaurants, from various sources, its distinctiveness would likely 
be eroded.54 
Polaroid was one of the first cases to directly address ‘dilution by blurring.’55  
Under an Illinois anti-dilution statute, the court found that Polaroid had a strong 
mark which through much effort and expenditure had acquired a widespread 
reputation and goodwill.  The secondary user, Polarad made goods related to the 
telecommunications industry while Polaroid’s goods were primarily photographic 
                                                                
47Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975).; See also Booth v. Curtis 
Publishing Co., 233 N.Y.S.2d 737, 743 (N.Y. 1962).  In Booth, defendants’ subsequent 
republication of plaintiff’s picture was ‘in motivation, sheer advertising and solicitation.  This 
alone is not determinative of the question so long as the law accords an exempt status to 
incidental advertising of the news medium itself’.  233 N.Y.S.2d at 743. 
48Namath, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 10. 
49See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996).  In 
Panavision, the court stated, “Registration of a trade[mark] as a domain name, without more, 
is not a commercial use of the trademark and therefore is not within the prohibitions of the 
Act.”; Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sci.s v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 
(C.C.D. Cal. 1997).  In Academy, the court held that the mere registration of a domain name 
does not constitute a commercial use.  989 F. Supp. at 1276. 
50MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 24:94. Dilution By “Blurring”: The federal statutory 
definition of what constitutes “dilution” of a famous mark is a fairly traditional definition 
which clearly encompasses dilution by “blurring.”  Dilution by blurring is the classic, or 
“traditional” injurious impact of the dilution theory as envisioned by its original proponents.  
Customers or prospective customers will see the plaintiff’s mark used by other persons to 
identify different sources on a plethora of different goods. 
51Id. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
54Id. 
55Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 492. 
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equipment. It did not matter that Polarad’s goods would not be sold in the same 
venues or in direct competition with Polaroid’s goods.  The widespread reputation 
and goodwill, the court said, Polaroid was not required to share with the defendant.56  
Similarly, in Tiffany & Co. v. The Boston Club, Inc.,57 the court found that 
Tiffany’s, the maker and seller of fine jewelry, had established a very strong mark 
for high quality of its merchandise and would thus suffer damage if a secondary user 
were permitted to use the name in association with a second-rate restaurant and its 
special promotions.58  The court’s decision hinged upon the strength of the 
“Tiffany’s” mark and the likelihood the secondary user’s use of the mark would 
diminish the uniqueness and distinctiveness of that mark and the strong quality years 
of marketing afforded it.59  It did not matter that the secondary user intended to use 
the name in association with a completely different, non-competing good.  
Cases interpreting the FTDA are relatively limited, but telling as to the breadth of 
this addition to the Lanham Act.  Marks that were found to be sufficiently similar 
and well known to support a dilution action under a blurring theory include 
“Polaroid” optical devices and “Polarad” heating and refrigeration services,60 and 
“The Greatest Show On Earth” for circus entertainment  and “The Greatest Used Car 
Show On Earth” for a car dealership.61  Marks held not distinctive enough to be 
diluted include “Cue” for a magazine, not diluted by “Cue” for toothpaste,62 and 
“Freedom” for a savings and loan company, not diluted by “Freedom” for real-estate 
services.63 
b.  Dilution by Tarnishment 
Courts have an additional basis for applying a dilution theory, which is 
“tarnishment.”  Where an accused diluter has used the plaintiff’s distinctive mark on 
inferior goods, or where the use otherwise occurs in an unwholesome or degrading 
context, an action in dilution by tarnishment may lie.  Where a mark has been used in 
such a fashion, Courts may protect against the diluting use reducing in some people’s 
minds the quality and esteem with which the public views the plaintiff’s mark.  A 
poster reading “Enjoy Cocaine” on a bottle identical to that used by Coca- Cola was 
found to be a dilution, due to the negative connotation between the plaintiff’s 
product and an illegal drug.64   
The Tiffany court also used a ‘dilution by tarnishment’ analysis when it found 
that Tiffany’s, the senior user, was entitled to trademark protection under the state 
                                                                
56Id. at 495. 
57231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass 1964). 
58Id. 
59Id. at 844. 
60Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963). 
61Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, 
Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988). 
62Cue Pub. Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 256 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1965). 
63Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1985).  
64Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
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anti-dilution statute.65  Dilution by tarnishment occurs when a secondary user has 
attempted to use or used the mark on inferior goods or in an unwholesome context.66  
By protecting a senior user from associations that may cause negative connotations, 
dilution by tarnishment seeks to further the goal of the dilution doctrine of protecting 
the goodwill senior users have often gone to great lengths to create.67  
In Tiffany, the defendant’s restaurant was enjoined from using the Tiffany name 
in connection with a “Breakfast at Tiffany’s” promotion because it would tarnish the 
senior user’s mark.68  The court found that because the defendant often advertised for 
his restaurant in the seedy sections of the newspaper, and due to the inferior quality 
of his restaurant, any association with his restaurant, which would may have 
occurred as a result of this promotion, would harm Tiffany & Co.69 
Some cases can only be reconciled when the dilution doctrine is applied, even 
though the court’s opinion only cited the Lanham Act.  This has been called 
“‘pseudo-dilution,’ in which a court has reached a result that can only rationally be 
explained by applying a dilution theory.70  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
enjoined the defendant’s use of a very similar slogan for an insecticide-floor wax, in 
an action brought by Anheuser-Busch, Inc., owner of the trademark “Where There’s 
Life . . .  There’s Bud.”71  It is quite clear the parties were not disputing over 
competing goods, as the market for Budweiser Beer and that for an exterminating 
floor wax may be very different.  The court treated the case as an infringement 
action, but it is difficult, at best, to see the relationship of competing goods.  It is 
likely that the court applied a dilution theory, in fact, although it was not labeled 
that.72 
In the non-competing context, First Amendment rights may preclude application 
of the dilution doctrine in the case of parody.  This is true even in cases where there 
may be evidence of tarnishment.73 
                                                                
65Tiffany’s, 231 F. Supp. at 838. 
66H.R. REP. NO. 104-374.  “The definition [of “dilution”] is designed to encompass all 
forms of dilution recognized by the courts, including dilution by blurring, by tarnishment and 
disparagement, and by diminishment.” 
67MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 24:94. 
68Tiffany’s, 231 F. Supp. at 838.  
69Id. 
7038 AM. JUR. P.O.F. 3D, Dilution of a Trademark  § 11 (1996). 
71Chemical Corp. of Am. v Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962).  The 
Chemical Corp.’s slogan was “Where There’s Life . . . There’s Bugs” the only difference 
between this slogan the that of Busch, Inc.’s was the alteration of “Bud” to “Bugs.”  
7238 AM. JUR. P.O.F. 3D, Dilution of a Trademark § 11 (1996). 
73MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 24:16[2], § 31:155; see also, Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim 
Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 1996).  In Hormel, the court held that “[w]e find, 
therefore, that the clarity of Henson’s parodic intent, the widespread familiarity with Henson’s 
Muppet parodies, and the strength of Hormel’s mark, all weigh strongly against the likelihood 
of confusion as to source or sponsorship between Hormel’s mark and the name “Spa’am.””  73 
F.3d at 503. 
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3.  The Cameo Role of The Copyright Act and So-Called “Fair Use” 
The Copyright Act contains a statutory provision that negates a finding of 
infringement where the allegedly infringing use falls within the ambit of “fair use.”74  
In other words, the statutory provision for fair use is a defense.  That allows 
secondary users of copyrighted material to have their interests weighed against the 
interests of the copyright holder.  As a defense, fair use acknowledges use of the 
material, but asserts a privilege for that use. 
Despite the many differences between trademark and copyright law, many courts 
have attempted to apply the fair use doctrine to trademark law which makes sense, 
since fair use, until the most recent of times, has always been, even in copyright, a 
judicial, not a statutory doctrine.75  Fair use allows a secondary user to use 
trademarked materials within certain contexts. 
This evolution has occurred because trademarks, which once identified the source 
of an item have come to identify the item itself.  Now, trademarks not only identify 
the source, but they are part of our everyday lives as well.  It is this necessity which 
has fueled the application of the fair use doctrine to trademark law.76  Absent a 
uniform standard, however, courts have reached very different results making it 
nearly impossible to predict the results of trademark infringement case rulings.  
Critics of the courts’ practices in applying fair use standards to trademark 
infringement cases have found the results troubling. 77 
                                                                
7417 U.S.C.A. § 107. The “fair use” clause of the 1976 Copyright Act states in part:  
“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.  In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include – (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature, or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
coyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.”; See Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 
539, 567 (1985).  The Harper Court stated that the last factor,” (4) the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” is the most important in 
determining whether a secondary use has fallen within the fair use exception. 
75H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553.  Copyright infringement 
was always non-statutory, and when it was codified, Congress expressly said it was codifying 
and not changing the law. Thus, the implication is that this was and remains a valid judicial 
area.   
76Smith, supra note 12, at 1533.; Some courts have applied a “nominative fair use” 
doctrine where a trademark has become the sole way of identifying a product.  The Ninth 
Circuit recognized this in Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Productions, Inc., 12 F. 
Supp.2d 1068, 1076 (C.D. CA 1998).  The Allegro court stated, “[t]o establish nominative fair 
use where a defendant uses a mark to describe the plaintiff’s product or service: (1) the 
product or service must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only 
that portion of the mark reasonably necessary to identify the product or service may be used; 
and (3) the user must take no action, beyond use of the mark, that would suggest sponsorship 
or endorsement by the trademark holder.  The fact that an allegedly infringing use is 
undertaken for profit and in competition for the registrant’s business is immaterial.”  
77Smith, supra note 12, at 1532. 
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The doctrine of “collateral use” has been applied to trademark law and allowed a 
secondary user to use a mark for any use that does not identify the source of the 
product.78  This type of allowable use which does not invoke a finding of trademark 
infringement.79  A secondary user in entitled to use and identify a trademarked 
product as part of a larger work so long as the public would not be deceived or led to 
believe that the senior user is somehow the source or sponsor of the secondary user’s 
item.80  Likewise, a secondary user does not necessarily commit an infringement by 
his failure to remove another’s mark.81 It is thus as a result of this distinction that 
dilution becomes an important additional issue, since it is only dilution that could be 
used to attack and otherwise fair use (that is, a use about which no consumer is 
confused, but the mark is still used in a way the owner does not wish.)  Many of 
collateral use cases involve the actual trademarked product, and thus collateral use 
has come to mean the association of the mark with the authentic product. 
Subsequent users of copyrighted material have asserted other defenses for use, 
which also fall under “fair-use.”  These include use for fair comment or parody, as 
well as the subsequent user’s constitutional right of free speech. 
a.  Parody 
A parody is a “form or situation showing imitation that is faithful to a degree but 
that is weak, ridiculous or distorted: a feeble or ridiculous imitation.”82  A parody is 
commonly referred to as a “take off” on another’s work. 83  Like the doctrine of fair 
use, parody is officially recognized as a defense to an infringement claim in 
copyright law.84  This defense has been imputed by courts to apply to trademark 
cases as well.  Cases involving parodies may encompass Lanham Act infringement 
and state anti-dilution claims, and courts must balance the rights of senior holders 
against the rights of secondary users’ rights of freedom of expression.85 
In theory, the doctrine of freedom of expression lies outside of the trademark 
laws because it applies only where identification of source is not at issue.86  In our 
increasingly commercialized society, however, the lines are becoming blurred. 
                                                                
78Tara J. Goldsmith, Note, What’s Wrong With This Picture? When The Lanham Act 
Clashes With Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 850 
(1997).  
79Id. 
80MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 11:47; see also Laura Secord Candy Shops, Ltd. v. 
Barton’s Candy Corp., 368 F. Supp. 851, 853 (N.D. Ill. 1973).  The Barton court held that 
where a fair use defense is proven, there will be no infringement (even if the use results in 
likely confusion).  368 F. Supp. at 853. 
81Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969). 
82WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (1993). 
83Gribbin, supra note 27, at 367. 
84See Hormel, supra note 73; see also Perez, supra note 14. 
85Gribbin, supra note 27, at 367-68. 
86Volkswagen, 411 F.2d 350, 352.  The Volkswagen court held that one may use another’s 
mark to adequately describe their services where it is necessary to accurately denote.  The 
court further held that use which is not likely to deceive the public does not rise to the level of 
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b.  First Amendment 
The First Amendment has often been claimed in both copyright and trademark 
infringement actions where a senior user is attempting to limit the speech of another 
by precluding the secondary user from using the allegedly similar material or mark.87  
Courts have analyzed these claims under two different forms of speech; that which is 
artistic speech and that which is commercial, both having different levels of 
protection afforded to them by the First Amendment.88 
i.  Artistic Speech 
The pinnacle of protection against censorship lies in the First Amendment.89  
Visual artists are afforded the same protections under the First Amendment that are 
afforded to writers and artists in other mediums.90  This so-called communicative 
speech, as McCarthy writes, is afforded the full protection of the First Amendment.91  
Unfortunately, the difference between speech that is purely communicative, and that 
which is commercial is becoming extremely blurred.92  The Supreme Court has 
recognized a lessened importance in this difference.93 
ii.  Commercial Speech 
Speech which is considered commercial is not devoid of First Amendment 
protection. It has been, however, afforded a more limited protection.94  Commercial 
speech has been defined by the Supreme Court as speech that does “no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.”95  Another test was used in Central Hudson Gas 
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n.96  This case held that speech which was an 
                                                          
infringement.  New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 
(9th Cir. 1992).  The New Kids court held that the fair use defense applies “where the use of 
the trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the 
cachet of one product for a different one.”  Id. at 308. 
87Vetter and Roche, supra note 41, at 7. 
88Id. 
89Goldsmith, supra note 78, at 839-40. 
90See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996).  See also Christina A. 
Mathes, Casenote, Bery v. New York: Do Artists Have a First Amendment Right to Sell and 
Display Art in Public Places?, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 103 (1998). 
91MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 31:37[9]. 
92See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
93Id. 
94See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 
534 (1987). 
95Virginia, 425 U.S. at  771 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co.v. Human Relations Comm’n, 
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
96447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  Central Hudson also established a test to determine whether 
regulation on such speech is proper. The Court looked to whether (1) the speech concerned a 
lawful activity and was not misleading, (2) the state government interest is substantial, (3) the 
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“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience” 
was commercial speech.97  
Although the Supreme Court has called the delineation between commercial and 
artistic speech “common sense,”98 it appears that a narrow scope has been 
determined for deciding what comprises commercial speech.  However, in the case 
of films and literature for that matter, the Courts should not examine the allegedly 
infringing material in this manner.  Film, books, and other mediums straddle the line 
between artistic and commercial speech in that they are artistic expressions that are 
also offered for sale.  The real determination courts should make is whether such use 
(however it may be classified) is likely to confuse consumers.99  Although a product 
sold under a similar trademark as another product in the same genre is more likely to 
confuse than a depiction of that product in a film, the recent practice of product 
placement confuses the issue.  As product placement becomes more commonplace, 
and films become increasingly akin to 120-minute “commercials,” it is more likely 
that consumer-film-goers will associate trademark holders whose products are 
depicted in a film with actual sponsorship of that film.100 
B.  The Set-Cases 
A very recent case addressed the Lanham Act with respect to photographic 
depictions of a popular landmark building.101  Chuck Gentile, a photographer, took a 
picture of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum and turned it into a poster, 
which he then sold in local shops.102  The Museum sought protection for dilution 
claiming trademark protection for their building.  The museum sought protection on 
the grounds that they had a trademark in their building design and service mark 
“Rock and Roll Hall of Fame,” (which Gentile had used to accurately describe his 
photograph) and consumers would be likely to believe that the museum was the 
sponsor of Gentile’s poster.103  The District Court agreed with the Museum to the 
dismay of photographic artists.  Holding that the Museum did have a trademark in 
the “unique and inherently distinctive” design of the building, the court issued an 
injunction.104 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this holding, but left behind 
dangerous dicta for future photographic depictions of alleged trademarks.  The Court 
held that Gentile was not liable to the museum for infringement because the Museum 
                                                          
regulation directly advances the government interest, and (4) the regulation is no more 
extensive than necessary to be upheld.  Id. at 566. 
97Id. at 561. 
98Virginia, 425 U.S. at 771. 
99Smith, supra note 12, at 1570-71.  
100See explanation of product placement.  Supra note 6. 
101Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prod., 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 
1998) (hereinafter Rock and Roll I). 
102Id. at 752. 
103Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prod., 934 F. Supp. 868, 870 
(N.D. Ohio 1996). 
104Id.  
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had not used its building design as a trademark.105  This implies that if the museum 
had used its building design as a trademark (and Gentile had used it in the same 
manner, identifying his poster,) they would have succeeded in enjoining Gentile’s 
photographic depiction of it.  The court also alluded to the fact that the strength of 
the public’s recognition of the museum’s building design as a mark for the museum 
would be pivotal in its decision, indicating that the Museum may have been close to 
proving a claim of dilution.106 
The opening appears to be where a company has consistently used the same 
depiction of their building design for identification and commercial purposes, then 
they will have established a protectable trademark right in the design of their 
building.  In fact, several very famous buildings have recently sought legal 
protection of the infringing users of their building designs including owners of the 
Chrysler Building and The New York Stock Exchange.107  If they succeed in the 
courts, they will join the well-known buildings such as Trump Towers, Citicorp 
Center and the Guggenheim Museum in establishing trademarks in their buildings’ 
design.108 
This, in theory, should only limit subsequent users who attempt to use the 
trademarks as trademarks.  For traditional trademark infringement under the Lanham 
Act, this is the case, because a mere depiction of the building as trademark would not 
be followed by a likelihood of confusion in most cases.  It becomes increasingly 
unclear, however, under the laws of dilution of the FTDA as part of the amended 
Lanham Act, what type of use of such a mark would be violative.  Without a 
requirement of likelihood of confusion, it is not clear whether a mere depiction of a 
famous building in a film would constitute dilution under the very broad 
requirements of the FTDA.109 
                                                                
105Rock and Roll I, 134 F.3d at 754.  The angle of Gentile’s photograph was one the 
Museum had not exploited commercially.  It was a different angle than used in their poster and 
in line drawings of the museum used on official museum merchandise.  Had Gentile captured 
this particular angle of the museum, the same angle in which the museum claimed they had 
established a trademark, the court’s dicta suggests he would have been held liable for 
trademark infringement. 
106Id.  
107Lucia Sitar, Comment, The Sky’s the Limit? The Emergence of Building Trademarks, 
103 DICK. L. REV. 821, 822 (1999). 
108David D. Kirkpatrick, No T-Shirts! Lofty Towers Trademark Images, WALL ST. J. EUR., 
June 12, 1998 at 11. 
109Under the FTDA, a trademark holder can prove dilution by a secondary user if he can 
prove (1) his mark is famous and (2) subsequent use occurred after his mark became famous.  
He also must prove that the (3) subsequent use was commercial, and (4) this use has cause 
dilution of the trademark.  Suppose, for example, a filmmaker captured Trump Towers in the 
background of his film.  The mark is obviously famous, and use occurred after its rise to fame.  
Trump may argue that the filmmakers use diluted the strength of his mark by associating his 
building with the film.  The only sticking point which may save the filmmakers from a claim 
of dilution would be the characterization of the use.  It is unlikely that appearing in the 
background of the film would constitute commercial use, even if the film is quite profitable 
(See supra text accompanying note 47; Namath, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 10.) But what about the case 
where the same shot in which Trump Towers appears is also used in promotional stills sent to 
ad agencies promoting the film?  What if that same shot were used in the promotional poster? 
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Another case involved a photographic depiction of a uniform that bore a very 
close resemblance to a nationally-known cheerleading team.  In Dallas Cowboy 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,110 the cheerleaders sought to enjoin the 
release of the defendant’s film, “Debbie Does Dallas,” which depicted women 
wearing similar uniforms and used the phrase, “Dallas Cheerleaders.”111  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that because the white boots, blue 
blouse and the star-studded belt and vest worn by actresses in the film were similar 
to those worn in performances by the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, a likelihood of 
confusion would exist if the film were released.  The Court also held that the 
cheerleaders had established a trademark in their uniform as well as a reputation for 
family entertainment and defendant’s “depraved” film and any perceived association 
with it would tarnish this reputation.112  
The Court found the defendant was liable for violating the Lanham Act and 
issued the injunction.113  His First Amendment defense failed likely because of the 
“unwholesome” sexual nature of the film despite his assertion that the work was a 
comment on “sexuality in athletics.”114  Because the court found that there were 
alternative avenues to make such a comment, the defendant was not protected under 
the First Amendment.115 
In a very similar case, however, the Supreme Court has extended that which may 
fall under the parody exception, this time in a copyright context.  Acuff-Rose Music, 
sued the rap music group 2 Live Crew and their record company, alleging that 2 Live 
Crew’s recording of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” infringed their copyright.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was 
a parody that used the original song in a manner falling within the fair use defense.116  
The Court of Appeals reversed this decision when it decided that 2 Live Crew had 
taken qualitatively too much of the song and that there existed a possibility of market 
harm which had been established by a presumption attached to commercial uses.117 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and held that 2 
Live Crew’s commercial parody may be a fair use within the meaning of The 
Copyright Act section 107.118  The Supreme Court ruled that claims arising under 
                                                                
110604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1979). 
111Id. at 202-03.  The film was about a fictional high school girl who was selected to 
become a cheerleader for the “Texas Cowgirls.”  The last scene of the film depicts “Debbie” 
partially clad in a uniform which was strikingly similar to that of the “Dallas Cowboy 
Cheerleaders.”  The promotional materials accompanying the film contained captions, which 
read, “Starring ex-Cowgirl Cheerleader, Bambi Woods,” and “You’ll do more than cheer for 
this ex-Dallas Cheerleader.”  
112Id. at 205. 
113Id. at 206. 
114Id. 
115Id. (citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972)). 
116Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
117Id. at 594. 
118Id. 
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this section of the Act require case-by-case analysis as opposed to bright-line rules, 
and the four statutory factors are to be explored and weighed together.  Justice Souter 
made it very clear that the fact that alternative avenues may have existed for 2 Live 
Crew get their message across, this was not dispositive of the claim of infringement.  
He also made it clear that mere commercial use was not presumptive of the 
possibility of market harm.  Finally, divergent from its holding in Dallas, The 
Supreme Court recognized that 2 Live Crew’s version of “Pretty Woman” was not 
obscene, but indicated that even if it was, it would not necessarily require a finding 
of infringement.119  It solidified that at least within the context of copyright, parody 
may claim fair use like other comment and criticism. 
In another parody case, trademark protection was denied for a company who held 
a trademark for its canned ham product when a film used a pig character with a 
similar name.120  The Second Circuit found several reasons that Hormel’s “SPAM” 
trademark was not infringed by a pig character named “Sp’aam.” First, Jim Henson 
and his Muppets were famous for wholesome, family entertainment. Second, it was 
not likely that viewers of Muppet Treasure Island would think that the film was 
somehow sponsored by Hormel, simply because there was a character with a similar 
name.  The court did recognize “[t]he similarity between the name ‘Spa’am’ and 
Hormel’s mark [‘Spam’ was] not accidental.”121  The Second Circuit recognized the 
defendant’s comic intent: Henson hoped “to poke a little fun at Hormel’s famous 
luncheon meat by associating its processed, gelatinous block with a humorously wild 
beast.”122 
The Second Circuit was not convinced that the dirty beast with the same name as 
the Hormel meat product would create a tarnished association in the minds of 
Hormel’s customers.  In National Federation of the Blind v. Loompanics Enterprises, 
Inc., the court noted “[w]here the use of the mark is in an unflattering context or a 
setting in which it would be disadvantageous to the mark’s holder, it would seem 
customer confusion as to endorsement or affiliation is particularly unlikely.”123 
In a divergent opinion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a famous 
beer manufacturer’s mark was infringed by a similar parody-type use.124  Anheuser-
Busch was again the plaintiff when it sued the publishers of Snicker magazine for an 
ad that appeared on the back cover of the magazine that contained marks fashioned 
after Anheuser-Busch’s Michelob beer trademark.  The ad was a parody that 
commented on the current event of a recent oil spill which purportedly affected 
waters used by the brewery in the manufacture of its beer. “One taste and you’ll 
drink it oily,” appeared in the ad as well as a disclaimer, which stated, “Snicker 
magazine Editorial by Rick Balducci. Art by Eugene Ruble.”  Although the district 
                                                                
119Id. at 573.  The Campbell court stated that the 2 Live Crew song “substituting 
predictable lyrics with shocking ones to show how bland and banal the Orbison song is.”  Id. 
120Hormel, 73 F.3d at 497. 
121Id. at 501. 
122Id. 
123936 F. Supp. 1232, 1242 (D. Md. 1996). 
124Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 814 F. Supp. 791 (E.D.Mo.1993), rev’d, 
28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir.1994).  
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court dismissed Anheuser-Busch’s complaint, holding that there was no likelihood of 
confusion, the Eighth Circuit reversed and entered a judgement for the beer 
company.125 
The Eighth Circuit criticized the district court for its finding that the editorial 
context required a “special sensitivity” to the First Amendment.126  For finding 
likelihood of confusion, the court examined (1) the strength of the trademark, (2) the 
similarity between both parties’ products, (3) the secondary user’s intent to confuse 
the public, (4) the degree of care reasonably expected, and (5) evidence of actual 
confusion.  The court held that because Busch’s marks were strong, and defendants 
substantially copied the marks, Anheuser-Busch was entitled to a judgement of 
infringement.  The court also noted that the defendants had “indifference” to the 
likelihood or even possibility of confusion, and had no First Amendment rights in 
using similar marks in their publication.127 
The court went a bit further in noting that there may have been other ways for 
Snickers to get their message across, and hinting that this may have influenced its 
opinion.  “This confusion might have to be tolerated if even plausibly necessary to 
achieve the desired commentary– . . . [b]y using an obvious disclaimer, positioning 
the parody in a less-confusing location, altering the protected marks in a meaningful 
way, or doing some collection of the above, Balducci could have conveyed its 
message with substantially less risk of consumer confusion. . . . The First 
Amendment does not excuse Balducci’s failure to do so.”128  The court appears to 
have added a “least confusing alternative” standard to the Lanham Act. 129 
Similarly, in Gemini Rising v. Coca Cola Corp.,130 The District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York found that Coca Cola was entitled to trademark 
protection from a company who made a poster depicting a large cola bottle which in 
the place of the “Coca Cola” name was the phrase, “Enjoy Cocaine.”131  The court 
determined that because the defendant used an exact reproduction of the plaintiff’s 
trademarked bottle design and script for the letters, the fact that the words were 
different did not entitle the defendant to First Amendment protection for his poster. 
Despite the defendant’s argument that its re- printing “Raid-Mark” in the place of 
“Trademark” was evidence this was a parody, the court instead held that this was 
further evidence of  “predatory intent.”132  Many factors contributed to the court’s 
finding of infringement including the disparaging effect to the plaintiff of the illegal 
narcotic reference in the defendant’s poster, and evidence of actual confusion, 
despite the fact that defendant was not attempting to sell merchandise similar to that 
                                                                
125Id. at 796-97. 
126Id. at 773. 
127Id. at 774. 
128Id. at 776. 
129Id.; Thomas S. Leatherbury, Media Law Explosion of Lanham Act Cases, 14 COMM. 
LAW 1 (1996); see also Dallas, 604 F.2d 200. 
130346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
131Id. at 1187. 
132Id. 
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of the plaintiff.133  This opinion, of course, was written before the 2 Live Crew case, 
which appeared to widen the permissible avenues for makers of parody and satire.   
Courts appear to reach divergent results on similar facts in finding infringement 
under the Lanham Act, even where courts should exhibit the most deference: artistic 
expression. Though some courts have recognized the importance of weighing a 
defendant’s First Amendment rights in artistic expression against the public’s right to 
be free from confusion,134 others have not.   
C.  The Cast of Characters 
1.  The Film Industry 
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York found that the title of the 
film “Karate Kid” did not infringe upon a karate studio by the same name.135  
Although his mark predated the series of films by several years, because he failed to 
establish a likelihood of confusion between his mark and that of the film, the studio 
owner was not entitled to federal protection under the Lanham Act for his mark.136  
The court also pointed out that the film did not put the school in a bad light, and that 
the studio owner had not sought an action for infringement until after the films had 
been released, and failed to seek action against a comic book of the same name 
which predated the film.137 
In another movie title case, Ginger Rogers sought protection for the use of her 
name in a film titled “Ginger and Fred.”138  The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that no action for infringement was present because the title of the film 
was not likely to confuse consumers that Ginger Rogers was involved in or 
sponsored the production in any way.139  The court’s decision seemed to hinge upon 
the finding that the subject matter of the film was dancing, and the title had some 
artistic significance to the film.  The dicta suggests, however, that were this not the 
                                                                
133Id. at 1188, 1190. 
134See e.g. Girl Scouts of America v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 808 
F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).  The Girl Scouts court held that publisher’s depiction of Girl 
Scouts in children’s book is not infringing because First Amendment rights outweigh 
likelihood consumers might be confused.  Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell 
Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).  The Cliffs Notes court held that public 
interest in free expression and parody outweighed slight risk of consumer confusion between 
covers when publisher  of study guide, “Cliffs Notes,” brought action alleging that cover of 
parody, “Spy Notes,” would give consumers false impression that parody was study guide 
publisher’s product.  
135DeClemente v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
136Id. at 51.  DeClemente is clearly a straight trademark case addressing the issue of who is 
the true originator or source of the product or service.  What if a karate studio had been 
portrayed in the film with a similar name?  Under the current trademark laws, this distinction 
is much less clear to make. 
137Id. at 50. 
138Rogers v. Grimaldi, MGM/UA, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
139Id. at 1001. 
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case and there existed no relevance of the title to the subject matter of the film, Ms. 
Rogers might have been successful in her claim for infringement.140 
In Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Productions, Inc., the plaintiff 
owned the service mark, “The Crime Channel” which was used in connection with 
their cable network.  The network’s programs are exclusively devoted to the subject 
of crime.  Defendant produced a film about a young boy who watches the network, 
and then commits several murders.  In the film, the defendant used the service mark 
of the Crime Channel and the slogan, “America’s first and only channel devoted 
exclusively to crime.”  Several other characters in the film try to urge to boy not to 
watch this channel.  The boy’s mother says, “You shouldn’t watch this,” and “I’ve 
told you time and time again not to watch these shows.”141  When the plaintiff 
alleged that defendant’s use of their mark caused irreparable injury, the court found 
that such injury was possible and The Crime Channel stated a claim for dilution.142  
Traditional trademark infringement under the Lanham Act may not be an 
immediate danger for film producers.  The requirement that use be commercial and 
in competition with the senior user’s goods may keep filmmakers free from liability 
under this Act.  Where a mark is not used a trademark sense, courts have been 
reluctant to find trademark infringement without  invoking the Lanham Act.  Films 
are unique, however, in that goods are sometimes sold in association with them (film 
merchandising), and the release of big films are often preceeded by trailers showing 
excerpts of the film, while promotional posters adorn movie theater lobbies months 
before a film’s commercial release.  It remains a gray area whether filmmakers will 
be completely free from violation of traditional trademark laws in these areas.  Of 
special danger to filmmakers is state anti dilution statutes and the FTDA because 
violation of these allows recovery for infringement of a trademark when used on 
unrelated goods.143  Dilution may apply to any use, not just trademark use or use on 
competing goods.144  Even more chilling to filmmakers, for a trademark holder to 
succeed on such dilution claims a finding of likelihood of confusion is not 
necessary.145  
2.  A Workable Standard 
Copyright cases of the recent past present a more workable standard for imputing 
fair use into trademark law.  The set designer of the film, “Seven” used several of 
Jorge Antonio Sandoval’s photographs in the background of the film.146  The 
                                                                
140Id.; See also Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications Intern., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d 
Cir. 1993).  The Twin Peaks court held that the Rogers standard was misleading and held that 
courts should first determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists.  Literary titles do not 
violate the Lanham Act “unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work 
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the 
source of the content of the work.”  
14112 F. Supp.2d 1068, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
142Id. at 1078-79. 
143MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 24:72. 
144Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031.  
145Dairy Queen, 35. F. Supp. 2d at 729. 
146Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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photographs were only visible in the background of the film and only appeared in the 
film for short lengths of time ranging from one to six seconds per shot in a scene 
lasting only one and a half minutes.147  It was for the foregoing reasons that the 
Southern District Court of New York held that the film did not contain images that 
were “legally cognizable copies” of Sandoval’s work. The court held that New 
Line’s use was fair use under the Copyright Act section 107.148 
Another recent case also involved the use of large sculptures as the background 
for a film.  An artist who designed four sculpted towers on a building sued when the 
producers of “Batman Forever” used the building as a backdrop for the film.  The 
artist, Andrew Leicester claimed his copyright in the work was infringed even 
though Warner Brothers had obtained permission from the owners of the building 
before including it in their film.  The court held in an unpublished opinion that 
Leicester’s copyright was not infringed even though his sculptures appeared in 
promotions and merchandise promoting the film.  Their holding rested upon the fact 
that the sculptures became a part of the building itself, and per section 120 of the 
Copyright Act such use does not constitute infringement.149 
Although the foregoing opinion appears to give film artists some leeway to use 
buildings as backdrops and comport with copyright law, other courts have held for 
the sculptors in similar cases.  Sculptor Frederick E. Hart created a bas-relief 
sculpture that adorns the National Cathedral in Washington D.C.  He sued when 
Warner Brothers used a sculpture in the film “The Devil’s Advocate” which 
substantially resembled his creation.  Using the same analysis the court used in 
Sandoval, the court found that Warner Brothers used the image of the similar 
sculpture for approximately twenty minutes of the feature length film.  This 
substantial amount of time combined with the fact that in one scene, the sculpture 
appeared to move erotically, contributed to the court leaning toward a finding that 
Warner Brothers infringed Hart’s copyright.  The case ultimately settled out of court 
and Warner Brothers was spared an injunction and was able to distribute its film in 
the home video market.150   
                                                                
147The entire film lasted 123 minutes. Internet Movie Database: 
<http://us.imdb.com/Title?0114369>. 
148Dicta from the court suggests, however, that had the photographs been used in 
promotional materials for the film, there may have been a different result.  Sandoval, 973 F. 
Supp. at 413; 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.  The Copyright Act provides in pertinent part:   “The fair use 
of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright.”  Four factors are taken into account for deciding whether a particular use is fair 
under § 107; (1) the purpose and character of the use is examined including whether the use is 
commercial in nature or is non-profit educational use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 
(3) the amount and substantiality used and (4) the effect of the use on the value and /or effect 
on the potential market for the copyrighted work.”  
14917 U.S.C.A. § 120 provides that the copyright in an architectural work that has been 
constructed does not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of 
the pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the 
building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.  
150Larry Witham, Sculptor Backed on ‘Advocate’ Lawsuit, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 11, 
1998, at A8.; see also John T. Aquino, IP Issues Concerning Art and the Movies, 6 NO. 1 
INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1 (1999). The European tradition of Moral Rights protect the artist 
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An analogous case represents a dangerous expansion of copyright law, which 
threatens fair use.  The Second Circuit Court held that use of a copyrighted work in a 
film, even where the work is out of focus and nearly unrecognizable, could still 
constitute infringement under the Copyright Act.  In Ringgold v. Black 
Entertainment Television,151 Faith Ringgold, an artist who created a “story quilt” saw 
a poster depicting her creation in the background of a cable television show when it 
aired.152  The original work was on display at and owned by the High Museum of Art 
in Atlanta, who created posters depicting the work which were sold in its gift shop.  
Ringgold granted the museum an exclusive license to sell the posters, and thousands 
have been sold to visitors of the museum since 1988.   
HBO Pictures, the producers of the television show “ROC,” used one of these 
posters in the background of a scene taking place in a church in the production of 
one episode of the show.  The poster actually appears in nine shots, and for a total of 
almost twenty-seven seconds of the twenty-three minute show.  The poster is in the 
background of the main action, is not referred to by the actors, and nothing in the 
camera work calls special attention to it.  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held that 
HBO’s use of the poster did not fall within the fair use standard under the federal 
copyright laws.   
In its opinion, the Second Circuit reversed the holding of the Southern District of 
New York, which held that the use, described as “incidental and reasonable” fell 
within fair use.153  It looked to the subject matter of the program, and the fact that 
HBO actively selected the poster for the look of that particular scene.  The poster, 
depicting a group of African-American people by a pond, was an appropriate 
decoration for a black church.  It was this active role in selecting the work without 
                                                          
from altered reproductions of their work which may negatively affect the reputation of the 
artist. This theory has been incorporated into United States law under the Visual Artists Rights 
Act of 1990 and various state moral rights statutes. Although the European predecessor 
purports to protect moral rights in reproductions of an artist’s work, in general, the laws of this 
country stop short of this and protect only an artist’s original work.  One exception to this is in 
New York, where many artist’s claims originate, the New York Artists’ Authorship Rights Act 
(a progressive statute which attempts to include reproductions within its scope of protection) 
states: “[N]o person other than the artist or a person acting with the artist’s consent shall 
knowingly display in a place accessible to the public or publish a work of fine art or . . . a 
reproduction thereof in an altered, defaced, or mutilated or modified form if the work is 
displayed, published, or reproduced as being the work of the artist, and damage to the artist’s 
reputation is reasonable likely to result therefrom . . .  [T]he artist shall retain at all times the 
right to claim authorship, or, for a just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of such work.  
The right to claim authorship shall include the right of the artist to have his or her name appear 
on or in connection with such work as the artist. N.Y. ART. & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (1), (2).  
It is unlikely whether this particular statue would be helpful in the case of films because often, 
copyrighted work is used as background material and is not at least expressly, being 
“displayed, published, or reproduced as being the work of the artist.”  
151Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1299, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
152Id.  The artist actually saw the program in 1995, in reruns, after it had originally aired in 
1992 and was shown again in 1994.  
153Id. 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
438 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:415 
obtaining the proper permission to use it that contributed to their finding for 
Ringgold.154 
It also examined the facts under section 107 of the Copyright Act to determine if 
HBO’s use could fall within fair use.  For the first factor of the fair use test, “purpose 
and character of the use,” the court held that the defendants had used the poster in the 
same manner it was intended to be used: for decorative purposes.155  When it applied 
the second factor of the test, the court held that the creative nature of the work 
favored the plaintiff.  In applying the third factor, the court agreed with the district 
court that the fleeting use did not meet the “amount and substantiality” needed for 
defeating fair use.  The court the warned, however, that one factor alone is not 
dispositive, and all must be examined in order to reach a fair result. Finally, the court 
found that since Ringgold had earned $31,500 in 1995 by licensing her work to 
others including films and television productions, defendant’s use without any 
compensation was evidence of an adverse impact on her sales.  In this finding, it 
rejected the district court’s finding that the depiction of the poster in a television 
show was likely to have little to no effect on actual sales of the poster.  In the end, 
this case was remanded but poses a dangerous trend for filmmakers, even though it 
can be distinguished because of the active choice involved. 156   
III.  RESOLUTION 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act poses a serious threat for filmmakers, much 
more so than found under the original Lanham Act.  A filmmaker can be found guilt 
of dilution without a finding that consumers would likely be confused by the 
allegedly diluting use.  The mere appearance of a mark in a film would not likely 
violate a trademark holders rights.  According dilution’s much less stringent 
standard, non-competing uses of a mark which would “blur” its strength would 
violate a holder’s rights.  Courts have used the FTDA in ways as broad as its 
language allows, and it poses a very serious danger for filmmakers while also 
threatening their First Amendment rights. 
Courts should adapt a similar fair use standard as that codified in copyright laws.  
This may alleviate the current disparities between courts in allowing a uniform 
standard for courts to apply to similar cases.  The FTDA presents too broad a 
standard without the requirement of a likelihood of confusion and should be re-
examined for the dangers it poses on freedom of speech.  Filmmakers and other 
visual artists should not be limited by strictly construed trademark laws.  As our 
society becomes increasingly commercialized, and photographers and filmmakers 
cannot be held liable for infringement for depicting such prevalent marks. 
LAUREN P. SMITH 
                                                                
154See Simon J. Frankel, Using Visual Art in Film and Television: Ya Gotta Have Art – 
And Permission, Too, 16 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 23 (1998). But what about scenes shot on 
location that include works of art (or copies) that happen to be there? For example, many 
public plazas (where location scenes may be shot) include sculptures still under copyright.   
155Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 79 (2nd Cir. 1997).  For 
additional discussion of the Ringgold court’s reasoning, see Frankel, supra note 154.  
156Though it is distinguishable because of the event of “actual selection” from cases where 
a mark’s appearance in the film is mere happenstance. 
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